We study antitrust enforcement to channel price-…xing incentives of cartels through setting …ne schedules and detection levels. Fines obey legal principles: punishments …t the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum …nes. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum …nes, ensure abnormal cartel pro…ts and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement. We derive the …ne schedule and detection level that are constrained-optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices. This …ne schedule makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices and situates below the maximum …ne. Raising minimum …nes raises the cartel price. Our results relate to marginal deterrence.
Introduction
Legal ceilings on antitrust …nes in both the US and the EU are insu¢ cient to deter cartels for realistic levels of detection e¤orts. 1 Ceilings make antitrust policies either completely ine¤ective or at best partially e¤ective in such a way that only low prices are deterred, but the high prices are still sustainable by the cartel. This raises the issue whether such negative result is inevitable in the presence of legal ceilings on antitrust …nes. Our study shows that even in the presence of insu¢ cient legal ceilings, it is possible to design a more e¤ective …ne structure that is welfare improving when compared to the policy prescriptions currently available in the antitrust literature. This constrained-optimal …ne schedule induces the lowest cartel price that is optimal for the cartel and, hence, reduces the dead-weight loss to its lowest achievable level. This improvement is achieved by making collusion on lower prices more attractive than collusion on higher prices. More precisely, we characterize the threshold price level for which all cartel prices below this price level will never be prosecuted, which implies that some mild o¤ences will be tolerated. Another striking result is that instead of increasing …nes to the legal upper bound, which has a lot of adverse e¤ects, antitrust agencies could implement a …ne schedule that induces a better outcome with a lower …ne level.
The modern economic theory of law enforcement stems from Becker's (1968) seminal paper.
The key message is that the implementation of legal rules changes the economic incentives for illegal practices and the main concern is how society should channel incentives to arrive at an e¢ cient deterrence of such practices. This requires deterring crime only when it is e¢ cient to do so and implementing enforcement in the most cost e¤ective way. Antitrust regulation to deter cartels incorporates the issue of sustainable concerted illegal activities by several o¤enders. 2 Also, the current antitrust literature is not explicit about how legal principles are integrated into the economic analysis. 3 Such principles re ‡ect society's moral values about justice and what legal rules are feasible. Legal principles may con ‡ict with the economic principle of e¢ ciency, which makes deterrence less e¤ective. The central aim of this paper is to make explicit the role of legal principles in the economic theory of law enforcement of concerted illegal actions in antitrust.
Becker's original analysis suggests a simple rule: Deter crime only when the harm it causes is greater than the bene…t accruing to the o¤ender, and to do it by setting the …ne and the probability of conviction so that the expected penalty just equals the o¤ender's bene…t. 4 As this theory takes the view that increasing the rate of law enforcement entails positive social costs, while …nes are socially costless, the optimal law enforcement for cartels dictates to set …nes to the maximum level in order to save on inspection costs. An adaptation of this rule to antitrust law enforcement is provided by Landes (1983) . In the case of cartels, bene…t consists of the additional collusive pro…ts plus any cost saving and quality improvement the coordinated practice may generate, net of any cost of enforcement, while harm consists of the consumer surplus transferred to …rms in the form of collusive pro…ts plus the utility of the foregone consumption due to the higher price, i.e., the deadweight loss. It has been argued by many researchers, such as Werden and Simon (1987) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) , that the cartel's bene…t from price-…xing is smaller than the harm it causes and that there are no such collusive infringements that may enhance social welfare. Hence, according to this simple rule, the e¢ cient expected …ne should be set at the lowest level that deters all possible cartels or all possible collusive prices and to set …nes to the maximum available level in order to save on inspection costs. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) argue that this simple policy prescription is too much in contrast with current practices of antitrust law enforcement in both the US and the EU. First, the EU and the US legislation explicitly sets restrictive ceilings to the maximum applicable …ne. 5 Second, an important legal principle is that punishments should be based on the gravity of the o¤ense in order to re ‡ect society's harm and illegal gains. For antitrust, the legislation attempts to relate the …ne to a rough measure of gravity that is approximated by the volume of a¤ected commerce or cartel's illegal gains in the US and by the relevant cartel turnover in the EU. These gravity measures aim to capture the consequences of cartel behavior for the colluding …rms and their victims. Third, an equally important legal principle is the principle of proportionality; the regulator should not take any action that exceeds the one which is just necessary to achieve the objective. 6 In terms of the …ne structures, this principle implies that the …ne should not be in excess of the lowest …ne that su¢ ces to prevent criminal activities.
Fourth, according to the current sentencing guidelines in the US and the EU, lower bound on antitrust …nes is set at zero. In general, such guidelines might allow for the possibility of positive minimum …nes, which our analysis can easily accommodate. One of our main contributions is to revise previous policy prescriptions for an extension of 4 Risk aversion and legal errors could reduce the optimal …ne, see e.g. Garoupa (1997 Garoupa ( , 2001 ), Polinsky and Shavell (1984 . 5 See also e.g. Bos and Schinkel (2006) , Bageri et al. (2013) , or Fabra and Motta (2013) . The problem of the insu¢ cient legal ceilings on antitrust …nes in the EU raised in the above mentioned papers will be discussed in more details in sections 2 and 4. 6 Similar interpretation of this rule can be found in e.g. Burca (1993) , Usher (1998) , Jacobs (1999) , Tridimas (2006) , Sullivan and Frase (2008) , Fish (2008) , or Sauter (2013) . the model in Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) in which all relevant legal principles are accounted for. In our model, the price is a continuous variable that is set strategically by the cartel to maximize its pro…t given antitrust enforcement that consists of a pair of instruments: detection and prosecution e¤ort and a …ne schedule. Antitrust enforcement is also endogenous and it is set strategically so that social welfare is maximized while the …ne schedule obeys the legal principles. Technically speaking, the …ne structure is a function of the cartel price and other parameters of the model. Optimizing over the space of all feasible …ne schedules is a challenging mathematical problem that we replace by an equivalent but simpler mathematical problem that is easier to analyze rigorously. The simpler problem exploits the "minmax" nature of cartel enforcement: given any level of detection and prosecution e¤orts, socially-optimal antitrust enforcement minimizes the pro…t-maximizing cartel price. This insight allows us to …rst determine the structure of the optimal …ne schedule for the setting where the resources devoted to detection and prosecution are exogenously given. Then, we extend this reasoning to the case in which antitrust enforcement consists of detection and prosecution e¤orts and a …ne schedule that are both endogenous. Our key …nding is that the structure of the optimal …ne schedule under exogenous e¤ort also emerges when the e¤ort level is endogenized. Moreover, our argument for the optimal structure is independent of reducing the social cost of the detection and prosecution e¤orts.
Another major result is that even in the presence of legal ceilings, it is possible to design a more e¤ective …ne structure that is welfare improving compared to the current policy prescriptions. We demonstrate this by constructing the most e¤ective optimal …ne schedule that satis…es four legal principles. The socially-optimal …ne schedule induces the lowest cartel price that is optimal for the cartel and, hence, reduces the dead-weight loss to its lowest achievable level. This improvement is achieved by making collusion on lower prices more attractive than collusion on higher prices. More precisely, we characterize the maximal threshold price level for which all cartel prices below this price level will never be prosecuted. We will identify this threshold as the minimal cartel price that antitrust enforcement can achieve. Alterna-
tively, the problem we analyze can be viewed as an implementation problem through antitrust enforcement rather than regulation: 7 Which …ne schedule implements the lowest achievable cartel price given current legal rules? We aim to derive the optimal …ne schedule and e¤ort levels that minimize possible welfare distortions given that the current sentencing guidelines set (either explicit or implicit) restrictions on …nes, such as above mentioned legal rules and upper bounds. One of the striking results is that instead of increasing …nes to the legal upper bound, which has a lot of adverse e¤ects, antitrust agencies could implement a "minmax"…ne schedule that induces a better outcome with lower …ne level.
The optimal …ne schedule we derive is related to the literature on marginal deterrence by Stigler (1971) , Shavell (1992) , Wilde (1992) , and Mookherjee and Png (1994) . 8 Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) analyze individual o¤enders and only two illegal acts under a constant legal upper bound. They derive that the …ne for the most-harmful act should be set equal to the legal upper bound, while the least-harmful act should receive a lower punishment that induces o¤enders to choose it. Mookherjee and Png (1994) generalize the analysis of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to a setting, in which the level of illegal activity is a continuous variable, and obtain that the range of less-harmful acts should be legalized. Their intuition is that such legalization reduces the cost of deterring the greater crimes. Our paper arrives at similar results in a di¤erent setting, even in the absence of enforcement cost arguments, by applying legal principles (such as bankruptcy considerations, proportionality and monotonicity)
imposed by antitrust enforcement. 9 Our intuition for this result is based on the mentioned "minmax" argument in the presence of legal ceilings, rather than on reduction of expected detection and prosecution costs argument. Further di¤erence between our analysis and the analysis in Mookherjee and Png (1994) is that we take into account the intertemporal aspects associated with cartel stability and incorporate the additional condition for sustainability of group violations by cartel members.
To summarize the paper contributes to the literature on Law and Economics at two interrelated levels, the theoretical and the policy level. Our …rst theoretical contribution shows that, independent of enforcement costs, it is socially optimal that "low-harm" concerted crimes
should not be penalized. Our second theoretical contribution is incorporating and analyzing the e¤ects of legal principles, modelled as constraints, in an advanced game-theoretic model. This is done by applying the "minmax" principle for the solution of the enforcement game played between AA and the …rms. At the policy level, we show that imposing legal principles allows to obtain sharp and novel policy implications in the context of antitrust enforcement. We provide an alternative solution that proves to be more e¤ective than simply raising …nes to the available legal upper bound for all types of o¤ences. We show that even in the presence of insu¢ cient legal upper bounds the e¤ectiveness of deterrence can still be improved by reducing …nes for mild o¤ences as our optimal …ne schedule prescribes. The resulting two-part structure of the optimal …ne schedule can be employed by antitrust agencies after calibrating it with industry speci…c parameters. 8 Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Souam (2001) investigated optimal antitrust policies under asymmetric information. In a number of cases they also …nd that it is optimal to tolerate some degree of collusion and allow low cost industries to engage in price-…xing. The rational for their results is, however, di¤erent. 9 Moreover, we extend the analysis in above mentioned marginal deterrence papers under weaker assumptions in the context of antitrust enforcement with group violations instead of multiple individual actions, including a non-constant ceiling instead of a constant ceiling.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal principles and how we implement them. Section 3 outlines the model. The optimal …ne schedule is derived in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the setting with endogenous detection e¤ort and con…rms the optimal …ne structure derived in Section 4. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Legal Principles of Antitrust
Current legislation in the US and EU restricts …nes based on legal and economical principles such as punishments should …t the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum …nes. In this section, we discuss these four principles and how to incorporate them into our analysis.
Punishments Fit the Crime: Antitrust guidelines in the US and EU are founded on the legal principle that punishment should …t the crime, see DOJ (2010) and EC (2006).
In practice, this principle translates into higher …nes for higher-gravity o¤enses. Generally speaking, the gravity of an o¤ence is related to both the harm caused by the o¤ense and the cartel's illegal gains. In the US, the gravity is measured by the volume of a¤ected commerce or cartel's illegal gains, while in the EU, it is often approximated by the cartel overcharge or turnover involved in the infringement.
Principle of Proportionality:
An important principle of current EU legislation is the principle of proportionality that states that regulators should not take any action that exceeds the one which is just su¢ cient to achieve the same outcome, see e.g. Burca (1993) , Usher (1998), Jacobs (1999), Tridimas (2006) , Sullivan and Frase (2008) , Fish (2008) , or Sauter (2013). 10 Interpreting this principle in terms of the …ne structure, it requires that the …ne should not be more than the lowest possible …ne that would induce the same market outcome,
i.e., the least restrictive means (LRM) test. 11 If …nes are considered to be socially costless, there is no reason to adopt this principle. However, excessive …nes may amplify the possible negative impact of antitrust enforcement, which can stem from unobservable legal errors. Hence, the rationale for adopting the principle of proportionality is to minimize any potential undesirable impact of the antitrust policy.
Legal Ceilings and Bankruptcy Considerations: Both the EU and the US legislation take into account bankruptcy considerations when imposing …nes. Normally, this is implemented by imposing (either explicitly or implicitly) ceilings on …nes. These ceilings are justi…ed 10 A detailed overview of the history and application of the principle of proportionality in the EU and the US is provided in Appendix A. 11 Similar interpretation has been employed in Jansen and Sorgard (2014).
on the ground that legislators do not want to jeopardize the …nancial stability of the o¤end-ing …rms. Besides employment considerations, high …nes that cause bankruptcy are against the ultimate goal of antitrust law because such high …nes would reduce the number of active competitors in the market.
In the EU, …nes are limited to up to 10% of overall total annual turnover, see e.g. EC (2006), Bos and Schinkel (2007) , or Bageri et al. (2013) . Total turnover is indirectly related to the illegal gains or price-markups in the markets corrupted by cartel agreements, because it consists of the total sales over all the product markets in which the company operates, while only some of these markets may be involved in the collusive agreement. In the US, the …nal …ne for undertakings must not exceed a maximum statutory limit which is the greatest of 100 million USD or twice the gross pecuniary gains the violators derived from the cartel or twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to the victims (see Bageri et al. (2013) ). In addition, in many cases in practice, such as the UCAR 1993 case, …nes were reduced even below the legal ceiling due to …rms'inability to pay. In such a setting, the existence of an implicit ceiling on …nes, which is determined by the …rms'limited liability, can be argued.
Minimum Fines: According to the current sentencing guidelines in the US, the base …ne can be zero for some mild o¤enses, see DOJ (2010). Moreover, rewarding …rms that violate antitrust law is not possible according to the current rules both in the US and the EU. This indicates that imposing no or a zero …ne has to be regarded as the minimum …ne.
Modelling Legal Antitrust Principles:
We analyze …nes that satisfy the legal principles listed above in an oligopoly model of price competition. Current antitrust legislation relates the …ne to a measure of gravity that is approximated by the cartel's illegal gains or by the cartel overcharge. 12 Because both cartel's illegal gains and overcharge are positively related to the relevant cartel price, we model the …ne schedule as a function of cartel price to accommodate the current practice in the US and EU. As in Becker (1968) and Posner (1976) , the optimal antitrust enforcement consists of a …ne schedule and e¤ort level of inspection and prosecution that maximize social welfare. In addition, the …ne schedule must satisfy all principles discussed above.
The bankruptcy considerations, the legal ceilings and the minimum …nes impose upper and lower bounds on the …ne schedule. The upper bound is a given function of the cartel price in order to capture current guidelines in the US and EU. By doing so, our approach 12 The 2006 Guidelines revise those adopted in 1998, with a view to increasing the deterrent e¤ect of …nes. Council Regulation 1/2003 (as with Council Regulation 17/62 before it) provides that companies may be …ned up to 10% of their total annual turnover. Within this limit, the revised Guidelines provide that …nes may be based on up to 30% of the company's annual sales to which the infringement relates. In particular, the basic amount of the …ne will be related to a proportion of the value of sales, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of infringement.
accommodates for the three main interpretations of the current guidelines: a constant upper bound, a percentage of annual overall turnover, and bounds related to the cartel's illegal gains. With respect to the minimum …ne, the …ne schedule is bounded by a legal lower bound in order to capture the feature that rewards are not allowed in the current guidelines in the US and EU.
The principle that punishment should …t the crime implies that a higher cartel price should cause a higher …ne. In other words, the …ne schedule should be non-decreasing in order to incorporate the possibility that a range of mild o¤enses are not …ned. The legal principle of proportionality requires that the …ne should be kept to the minimum that is just necessary to induce the best social outcome within the domain of …ne schedules that satisfy the other three principles.
The Model
Consider an in…nitely-repeated oligopoly model with discounting in the presence of antitrust enforcement. Given the probability to be detected and the …ne structure, if the …rms collude, they will be detected probabilistically and …ned according to the …ne structure. We study a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game model where the cartel maximizes its present value of the stream of pro…ts under the antitrust policy that satis…es the four legal principles discussed in the previous section.
In every period, n 2 …rms compete in a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly model. 13 Antitrust enforcement consists of the antitrust authority's (AA) e¤ort level to detect and prosecute the cartel and a …ne structure. A higher e¤ort of detection/prosecution leads to a higher probability to detect the cartel, but associates with a higher cost. Due to limited resources of the AA, assume that the probability to detect the cartel is given by 2 [0; 1].
Note that = 0 is equivalent to a situation with no antitrust enforcement. In section 5, we endogenize the detection probability. Rey (2003) that only misconduct in the current period is prosecuted. The …ne schedule ( ) is a function of p that obeys the legal principles discussed in the previous section. It is continuous, nondecreasing, satis…es proportionality, and the legal upper and lower bounds. 14 We interpret (p) = 0 as no prosecution. 15 The legal upper bound ( ) is assumed to be positive, continuous and nondecreasing in p.
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The legal principle of proportionality requires some explanation. A …ne schedule that is limited by an insu¢ cient legal upper bound is ine¤ective to deter some cartel prices and, hence, the cartel will form. Given and ( ), the cartel will choose the optimal cartel price that maximizes the present value of its member's pro…t with discount factor 2 (0; 1). The …ne schedule ( ) satis…es the legal principle of proportionality if there does not exist another …ne schedule^ ( ) ( ) such that^ ( ) induces the same optimal cartel price as ( ) does. Observe that the static Nash equilibrium price p N is always sustainable by subgame perfect equilibrium for all 2 (0; 1), which is also the …rst-best outcome in the model outlined above.
In our study we will investigate the following trigger strategy pro…le in the presence of antitrust enforcement: The …rms collude at price p > p N in the …rst period and continue to set price p as long as no …rm deviates from the cartel price p irrespective whether the cartel is detected or not. Any price deviation by some of the …rms will lead to the static Nash equilibrium price p N in every period thereafter. The behavior after any deviation re ‡ects a permanent breakdown of trust among the …rms, and without trust, the …rms will not be able to form a cartel anymore. As in Motta and Polo (2003), here we assume that the cartel will continue every time it is detected and …ned. 17 Let v(p; ) be the present value of a …rm's expected pro…t from the above strategy pro…le.
14 This class of …ne schedules accommodates the current practice of …nes that are related to the illegal pro…ts, revenues, or cartel overcharge through the gravity of the o¤ence as described in OECD (2002), EC (2006), and DOJ (2010). These practices can be seen as …nes that are non-decreasing functions of the cartel price. 15 Mookherjee and Png (1994) also introduce the prosecution rate as an instrument to be set by the AA. In case there are no social costs associated with the level of the …ne, they show that the AA always chooses to prosecute with probability one. In our model, such a prosecution rate must also be equal to one whenever the AA sets a positive expected …ne and this rate would be undetermined if the AA sets an expected …ne of zero. For these reasons, we omit modelling a prosecution rate. 16 In Houba et al. (2014) we elaborate on combining legal ceiling and bankruptcy considerations according to current antitrust sentencing guidelines and perform a numerical analysis for the special case of Bertrand competition with linear demand. 17 Alternatively, Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 and Houba, Motchenkova, and Wen (2012) consider situations where the cartel will dissolve with either certainty or some probability each time it is detected. Assuming the cartel will reestablish after each time it is detected is consistent with the cartel's pro…t-maximizing behavior. It is worthwhile to point out that how the cartel behaves after it is detected does not change the qualitative aspect of our analysis and results.
It equals the current illegal net pro…ts (p), minus the expected …ne (p), plus the expected continuation value v(p; ). Solving for v(p; ) yields the following pro…t function for every cartel member:
As in Motta and Polo (2003) , price-deviating …rms will not be prosecuted. 18 Given the trigger strategy pro…le, the pro…t of any …rm from a unilateral deviation is equal to the short-term net gain opt (p) in the current period, minus an expected …ne of zero (no prosecution), plus the normalized pro…t from p N forever. The necessary and su¢ cient condition to support cartel price p 2 p N ; p M by a subgame perfect equilibrium is
An optimal cartel price maximizes the present value of each …rm's expected pro…t and the set of optimal cartel prices is
Observe that a lower cartel price implies a lower deadweight loss, or a higher social welfare.
Hence, our objective is to identify the optimal …ne schedule that induces the lowest optimal cartel price in the class of …ne schedules that satisfy the four legal principles. The design of the optimal …ne schedule takes into account the optimal reaction by the cartel to the antitrust enforcement.
The Optimal Fine Schedule
In this section, we will characterize the optimal …ne schedule in the following three steps. First, we identify the pro…t level the cartel can guarantee to each …rm when facing any …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles. Second, given the legal lower bound of a …ne schedule, we derive the lowest possible cartel price at which each …rm receives the minmax pro…t we identi…ed in step one. Lastly, we provide a …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles and induces the minimal cartel price. We will show that this …ne schedule is the lowest …ne schedule that also induces this minimal cartel price, and it is the optimal …ne schedule. We conclude this section by relating our results to the literature on marginal deterrence.
The Minmax Cartel Pro…t
The rationale of the Beckerian tradition is that the expected loss of being punished should outweigh the expected bene…t of committing the crime, see e.g., Becker (1968) or Posner (1976) . The condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970) states that the marginal bene…t of an illegal activity should be equal to the marginal expected …ne to deter such an activity.
In its most elementary form, this suggests (p) (p) in our antitrust enforcement problem, where the Beckerian tradition and Stigler's marginal deterrence are equivalent. If the AA were able to set the …ne high enough, such as (p) > 1 (p) for all p > p N , it would be unpro…table for the …rms to collude because equilibrium condition (2) fails for all p > p N .
Bos and Schinkel (2006), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) , Wils (2007) , and Harrington (2010), 19 however, point out that the current inspection e¤orts and the existing upper bounds on …nes, at least in the EU and several OECD countries, are insu¢ cient to deter all cartels. 20 This might be a consequence of bankruptcy considerations that impose, say,
. 21 Then, no matter what the legal upper bound on …nes may be, for a low enough detection probability the upper bound cannot prevent the cartel from colluding at a price above p N . 22 This suggests that the existing legal upper bound (p) and levels of detection probability not only fail the Beckerian structure but also are not high enough to deter cartel formation so that some collusive prices can still be sustained, i.e. the following inequality holds
for some p 2 (p N ; p M ]. Accordingly, we assume that the exogenous legal upper bound (p)
satis…es (4), so that any …ne schedule (p) bounded by the legal upper bound (p) is also insu¢ cient to deter all cartel prices.
Recall that we are searching for the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles, including the legal upper bound. For any …ne schedule
which implies that such p can also be sustained as a cartel price when the …ne schedule (p)
is imposed. Inequality (5) also implies that if the …rms set the corresponding optimal cartel price, each cartel member receives no less when facing (p) than when facing the upper legal bound (p). In other words, when facing a …ne schedule that obeys the legal upper bound, each cartel member will be able to receive at least what it can receive when facing the legal upper bound and setting the corresponding optimal cartel price.
Proposition 1 For all …ne schedules ( ) ( ), we have
Proof. Take any optimal cartel price when facing the …ne schedule ( ),
, so p C can also be sustained as a cartel price if the …ne schedule is (p). Note that the left-hand side of (6) is greater than or equal to v(p C ; ) v(p C ; ), which is the right-hand side of (6).
In fact, the right-hand side of (6) is at least what the cartel can guarantee each member when facing any function that obeys the legal upper bound. It plays an important role in …nding the optimal …ne schedule. Accordingly, we denote this minmax cartel pro…t as
= min max
We denote p as a pro…t maximizing price for the cartel. Under the legal upper bound ( ), the condition for sustainable cartel prices requires that v ; opt ( ). Figure 1 illustrates both v ; and opt ( ), together with the range of sustainable cartel prices between the square brackets on the price axis. Under the legal upper bound ( ), the cartel sets optimal cartel price p in this range and each …rm obtains v .
The minmax cartel pro…t v plays a prominent role in determining the optimal …ne schedule. It can be viewed as the cartel's security level or the lowest maximal cartel pro…t for all …ne schedules that are bounded by the legal upper bound. More speci…cally, for any …ne schedule ( ) that is bounded by the legal upper bound ( ), a …rm's pro…t v ( ; ) is always bounded from below by v ; . Because opt ( ) does not depend on the …ne schedule, any cartel price under the legal upper bound, such as p C ( ), can also be sustained as a cartel price under such a …ne schedule ( ). Therefore, under …ne schedule ( ) ( ), the cartel is able to obtain at least as v by setting its price at p :
The minmax cartel pro…t v and the optimal cartel price p
In general, however, each …rm may receive more than v when facing a …ne schedule that is less than the legal upper bound.
The Minimal Cartel Price
Imposing the legal upper bound will certainly induce the minmax cartel pro…t v to every …rm. However, given that it is impossible to prevent the cartel under the legal upper bound, the objective of antitrust enforcement is not to minimize the cartel pro…t, but rather to minimize the harm caused by the cartel. Given a …ne schedule must also satis…es three other legal principles, the question is how to minimize the harm caused by the cartel given that each …rm will be able to receive a pro…t that is at least the minmax cartel pro…t. In this subsection, we identity this achievable minimal cartel price.
Recall the value function (1) and any …ne schedule must also be bounded from below by some exogenous legal lower bound, normalized to be zero. For (p) 0, we have
Proposition 1 asserts that no matter what …ne is imposed, the optimal cartel pro…t is at least v . Therefore, in order for any p 2 (p N ; p M ] to be a possible optimal cartel price, it must be the case that
Given the monotonicity of the pro…t function (p) for p 2 (p N ; p M ], there is a unique pricê p = 1 ((1 )v ) at which (9) holds with equality, where 1 ( ) is the inverse function of
Therefore, given the constraint that ( ) 0, the cartel must set its price equal top or above in order to ensure each member's pro…t is at least the minmax cartel pro…t v . Now we argue that suchp can be sustained as a cartel price if (p) = 0. Observe that
where the last inequality is due to (8) . Because (p ) 0, the monotonicity of ( ) implies that (p) (p ), which in turn implies thatp p . Due to the assumption that opt ( ) is also monotonically increasing, (10) implies that
which means thatp can be sustained as a cartel price. We will show thatp is the lowest possible optimal cartel price when the …rms face any …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles. For this reason, we callp the minimal cartel price. This result is formally presented as Proposition 2 For any …ne schedule ( ) that satis…es the four legal principles, any optimal cartel price is bounded from below by the minimal cartel pricep
Built upon Figure 1 , Figure 2 illustrates how the minimal cartel price is determined by the minmax cartel pro…t. Recall that minmax cartel pro…t v is the maximal cartel pro…t when the legal upper bound ( ) is imposed. Given the monotonicity of pro…t function v(p; 0) = (p)=(1 ), the minimal cartel price is the one at which each …rm receives exactly the minmax cartel pro…t when the legal lower bound 0 is imposed. For simplicity, we choose not to illustrate the equilibrium condition as we have shown that if (p) = 0, the minimal cartel pricep can be sustained as an equilibrium price by the trigger strategy pro…le.
In searching for the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es the four legal principles where the legal upper bound is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity, the objective of antitrust enforcement should shift to minimize the harm caused by the cartel. This translates into minimization of the optimal cartel price in order to take into account the cartel's response to the …ne schedule set. Proposition 2 shows that within the class of …ne schedules considered, it is impossible to reduce the cartel price below the minimal cartel price. Now the question is whether it is feasible to induce this minimal cartel price with a …ne schedule that not only satis…es the upper and lower bounds, but also monotonicity and, more importantly, proportionality. If such a …ne schedule exists and indeed induces the minimal cartel price, it is the optimal …ne schedule under the four restrictions imposed by the legal rules and conventions.
Characterization of the Optimal Fine Schedule
We now derive a …ne schedule under which the minimal cartel price is an optimal cartel price.
As we have argued, such a …ne schedule induces the lowest possible optimal cartel price that
The minimal cartel pricep.
is the second-best outcome given that the cartel cannot be completely prevented due to the legal upper bound on …ne schedules. Hence, the …ne schedule we derive is indeed the optimal …ne schedule. In doing so, we utilize all four legal principles, namely monotonicity, lower and upper legal bounds, and proportionality. In order to achieve the minimal cartel pricep, it is necessary that it can be sustained as a cartel price and that each …rm receives the minmax cartel pro…t v . This requires that the …ne should be set to 0 when the …rms collude at the minimal cartel pricep. Because the …ne schedule must satisfy monotonicity and the legal lower bound of 0, we conclude that (p) = 0 for all p 2 [p N ;p]. For this range of prices, whether they can be sustained as cartel prices or not, monotonicity and the legal lower bound are binding in determining the optimal …ne schedule.
Next consider the price range (p; p M ]. If the legal upper bound ( ) were imposed, the cartel would receive at most a pro…t of v by selecting a cartel price p 2 (p; p M ]. Given the minmax cartel pro…t v from setting the price at the minimal cartel pricep, the necessary and su¢ cient condition forp to be an optimal cartel price is that for all p 2 (p;
Condition (11) asserts that either p can be sustained as a cartel price but each …rm does not receive more pro…t than v , or p cannot be sustained at all. Rewriting (11) yields
The legal principle of proportionality requires that the …ne is just high enough to reduce the cartel pro…t either to v for any p 2 (p; p M ], or to upset the equilibrium condition (2).
Moreover, in order to obey this principle we need to identify the minimum of these two righthand sides. This yields two cases in (12) Figure 3 .
23
Proposition 3 When opt (p M ) v , the optimal …ne schedule is given bŷ
Proof. Because (p) = (1 )v by Proposition 2, we have
hence,^ ( ) in (13) 23 An alternative …ne schedule often discussed in the literature (see e.g. Immordino and Polo (2013) ) that can implementp is a stepwise …ne function. Such stepwise function can also be generated in our setting. However, it only satis…es three legal principles (minimal …nes, legal upper bound, and punishment …ts the crime) and violates the proportionality principle.
The optimal …ne^ (solid) and the legal upper bound (dotted).
is an optimal cartel price because any other price either cannot be sustained as a cartel price or each …rm will receive at most the minmax cartel pro…t.
Recall that in the presence of the legal upper bound the …rst-best …ne schedule is infeasible and antitrust enforcement is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity. In this case, some cartel prices can be sustained by the cartel and society incurs a deadweight loss. The important question is how to keep the deadweight loss minimal given the legal upper bound. According to Proposition 3, the e¤ectiveness of the …ne schedule in reducing the optimal cartel price can be maximally improved by adapting …ne schedule (13) . Figure 3 illustrates that this …ne schedule satis…es all four legal principles. Within this class of …ne schedules, it is the only one that achieves the smallest attainable optimal cartel pricep. Fine schedule (13) induces the cartel to setp as its optimal cartel price. This price lies strictly between the Nash equilibrium price p N and the optimal cartel price p when the legal upper bound is imposed. This reduces the deadweight loss caused by the cartel.
The maximal reduction of the optimal cartel price is achieved by making all prices in the range betweenp and p M as attractive as p by reducing the …ne below the legal upper bound.
Moreover, …ne schedule (13) does not punish mild o¤ences of collusion on cartel prices beloŵ p. This result supports the procedure of determination of the base …ne in the current US sentencing guidelines, see DOJ (2010), where o¤ences of mild gravity would be assigned a base …ne of zero. Note that the value function under^ ( ) is given by
which is illustrated in Figure 4 .
The value function v(p;^ ) under the optimal …ne^ (p).
Proposition 3 describes the unique SPE outcome supported by the trigger strategy pro…le.
Even if some prices above the minimal cartel pricep can be sustained by the cartel, they are all optimal in the sense that these yield the same pro…t v to the cartel. In this equilibrium, the cartel selects the smallest optimal cartel price. There are practical reason why the cartel may prefer to choose this smallest optimal cartel price, such as increase the popularity of the product. Furthermore, if the cartel does not choose this smallest optimal cartel price, the AA would have an incentive to increase the …ne slightly higher than^ (p) for any price p >p, so that the cartel would not choose such price p >p.
Discussion and Relation to the Literature
In this subsection, we …rst discuss the robustness of our results and their comparative statics before we relate our results to the literature on marginal deterrence.
Discussion
Our results are robust. All qualitative results obtained thus far can also be obtained if the detection probability continuously depends upon the cartel price, which only requires straightforward substitutions in every expression containing the detection probability. A legal lower bound di¤erent from 0 requires the following minor modi…cation. Let (p) denote the lower bound on the …ne schedule. Then, in Figure 2 , we replace the curve v (p; 0) by the curve v(p; ) and proceed as before. The modi…ed minimal cartel price solves (p) (p) = (1 ) v and such price is well de…ned. At the minimal cartel pricep, a legal lower bound above 0 implies that the left-hand side is lower than the right-hand side. In order to restore equality, the …rst term, (p), has to increase. Hence, a lower bound above 0 increases the minimal cartel price.
In many cases in reality, cartel members and the AA reach pretrial settlements. Assuming such settlements can be captured by a non-decreasing continuous function of the cartel price, one can easily redo our analysis by substituting this settlement function for the legal upper bound. Settlement payments that lie below the legal upper bound reduce the expected maximal penalty and, hence, increase the minmax cartel pro…t and the minimal cartel price.
Then, this reduces the e¤ectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Of course, this would ignore the role of defense litigation costs or private damages the cartel members might pay. Both can be modeled through an increase of the legal upper bound and, hence, have the desirable e¤ect of lowering the minimal cartel price. The combined e¤ect of pretrial settlements and defense litigation costs on the minimal cartel price is ambiguous and needs further investigation. One solution is that pretrial settlements might act as an instrument for implementing the optimal …ne schedule.
Relation to the Literature
For the case of a di¤erentiable pro…t function, the optimal …ne schedule for cartel prices in the range [p; p M ] satis…es the condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970) that states that the marginal bene…t of the o¤ense should be equal its marginal expected cost. Even in the absence of di¤erentiability, marginal deterrence holds in the following sense. The cartel has no incentive to set a price in the lower range of prices because the present value of pro…ts for each individual …rm is strictly increasing in the cartel price on this range due to the zero …ne. Also, this present value is less than the security level and, hence, these cartel prices are not optimal. These insights also relate to the results in Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) where the design of the optimal (di¤erentiable) …ne schedule should be such that the condition of marginal deterrence is achieved on p N ; p M . Application of their ideas to our setting would imply that the optimal …ne schedule solves the di¤erential equation
In case the di¤erential equation would also be solved for p 2 p N ;p , it violates the legal lower bound. Stigler (1970) and Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) are silent on the issue of sustainability of concerted illegal actions and, hence, our results generalize their analysis to include such concerted actions. In addition, we also extend the analysis to nondi¤erentiable pro…t functions and non-constant legal upper bounds. Note that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions in antitrust enforcement by ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. Therefore, both individual and group violations with concerted illegal actions are integrated into one unifying framework.
Before we relate our results to the marginal deterrence studied by Shavell (1992) 
With these observations in mind, we relate our results to the theory of marginal deterrence in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) for individual o¤enders and two illegal acts under a constant legal upper bound and a common production of detection and conviction. 24 These references derive that the optimal …ne is non-decreasing in the level of harm in order to induce o¤enders to choose the least harmful act. For antitrust enforcement, illegal acts are represented by a continuum of cartel prices and both the cartel's illegal gains and society's deadweight loss are increasing in the cartel price. Although the optimal …ne schedule is non-decreasing in the cartel price, it is directly related to illegal gains rather than to society's harm. As a thought experiment in terms of two illegal acts under a constant …ne schedule in our model, consider the case p 2 [p; p ) and, for a constant legal upper bound, p that is either the monopoly price or the maximal sustainable cartel price. We have shown that the optimal …ne for p is strictly lower than the …ne for p . For the remaining case p 2 p N ;p and p , the optimal …ne schedule cannot induce the cartel to choose the least harmful act because for such price even the zero …ne is not low enough to provide the proper incentives. If that case arises in their model, Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) set the …ne equal to the legal upper bound and this is in contrast to the principle of proportionality that would set the …ne equal to zero.
Recall that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions by ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. Mookherjee and Png (1994) generalize the analysis of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to a setting in which the level of illegal activity is a continuous variable, and similar to our results, they obtain that the range of least-harmful acts should be legalized. The intuition in 24 The inspection and prosecution e¤orts of antitrust enforcement are such that a sector must be investigated in order to determine the actual cartel price set. The AA cannot target its activities on speci…c cartel prices beforehand. Therefore, in terms of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) , the production of antitrust enforcement classi…es as common production of detection and prosecution.
Mookherjee and Png (1994) is, however, di¤erent from ours. They conclude that the range of less harmful o¤ences should be legalized in order to reduce the costs of deterring more harmful o¤ences. Our study provides an alternative rational for this result, even in the absence of cost saving argument, and alternative derivation of these results under weaker assumptions in the context of antitrust enforcement with group violations of concerted illegal actions instead of multiple individual actions. 25 We model explicitly legal principles (such as bankruptcy considerations, proportionality and monotonicity) imposed in antitrust enforcement. Our intuition for this result is based on "minmax" argument in the presence of legal ceilings, rather than on an argument that seeks to reduce detection and prosecution costs. A further di¤erence between our analysis and the analysis in Mookherjee and Png (1994) is that we take into account the intertemporal aspects associated with cartel stability and incorporate the additional condition for sustainability of group violations by cartel members.
The main implication of our analysis is that antitrust enforcement should not punish maximally overall, but punish in a smarter manner such that mild o¤enses are not …ned at all. This implies a reconsideration of the common prescription in the economics of crime that setting the …ne equal to the available legal upper bound always increases the e¤ectiveness of deterrence. Similar criticism has been raised within Law and Economics on the optimality of maximal punishments, which addresses the "Becker paradox". For example, Shavell (1991) shows that maximal punishments are insu¢ cient when law enforcement is not speci…c to a single o¤ense. Also Andreoni (1991) and Persson and Siven (2007) show that scaling the punishment to the severity of the o¤ence is optimal given the possibility of legal errors.
Optimal Antitrust Policy
The optimal trade-o¤ between resources devoted to detection/prosecution and the severity of punishment has been a major issue within the law and economics literature (see e.g. Shavell (1979, 1992) or Garoupa (1997 Garoupa ( , 2001 ) for an overview). Our analysis of the previous section focussed on the optimal …ne schedule given an exogenous level of resources spent on detection. In this section, we endogenize these resources in the form of an endogenous detection probability. This introduces a second policy dimension. We show that, when taking into account the socially optimal trade-o¤ between the two policy dimensions, the structure of the optimal …ne schedule identi…ed in Section 4 must be preserved.
We analyze the following straightforward extension of our model. Endogenous antitrust enforcement consists of the pair of instruments ( ; ) : an endogenous detection probability Solving for w(p; ; ) yields the social welfare function:
The objective of antitrust enforcement is to maximize social welfare.
Given endogenous antitrust enforcement ( ; ), the pro…t function for every cartel member remains given by (1), prices that the cartel can support still obey (2) and the set of optimal cartel prices solves (3). Since both and are endogenous, we include into our notation and write v (p; ; ) for the present value of a …rm's expected pro…t and p C ( ; ) for an optimal cartel price. Given the objective of antitrust enforcement and the optimal reaction by the cartel, the aim of antitrust enforcement becomes to maximize social welfare w(p C ( ; ) ; ; ) over all pairs of instruments ( ; ), where
Before proceeding with the identi…cation of optimal antitrust enforcement, we will introduce the minimal level of detection the AA has to impose in order to achieve full deterrence that eradicates all cartel prices above the competitive level. This minimal level of detection, denoted as , is obtained by rewriting (4) and is de…ned as has to be lowered to 0 in order to achieve deterrence.
Similar to the discussion in Section 4.3, we identify two cases. The distinction between these cases can, again, be related to the level of the legal upper bound ( ). In case the legal upper bound is relatively low, will be relatively high. Then, we might even have > 1 and all levels of detection are insu¢ cient to achieve full deterrence under the legal upper bound.
Only by reconsidering the legal principles and raising the legal upper bound might achieve full deterrence. In the second case, the legal upper bound is relatively high, is relatively low and we might have < 1. Then, society has an option to achieve full deterrence by setting any 2 ; 1 and the question is whether society prefers to do so, or rather prefers some < that only partially deters. In both cases, society faces the traditional trade-o¤ between resources spent on detection and the severity of punishment. Only in the second case, society also faces a trade-o¤ between the more ambitious objective of full deterrence versus the less ambitious objective of partial deterrence.
We treat the case of a relatively-low legal upper bound in this section, characterize the corresponding optimal pair of antitrust instruments, and utilize it to illustrate our main results, contributions to the literature, and the policy implications. The analysis of a relativelyhigh legal upper bound has similar policy implications, however, it also involves technical complications related to existence of optimal antitrust enforcement. For that reason, we postpone the analysis of this case to Appendix C.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the case of > 1 as representing a relativelylow legal upper bound where full deterrence is out of reach and only partial deterrence is feasible. This set up also seems to be most relevant from the current policy discussion in e.g.
Bos and Schinkel (2006), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) , or Harrington (2010) who argue that …nes both in the US and the EU are insu¢ cient to fully deter cartel activity given realistic levels of detection probabilities.
The following result shows that the structure of the optimal …ne schedule identi…ed in the previous section has to be preserved in the setting where both the probability of detection and the …ne schedule are endogenous. In order to state it, we writep ( ) for the minimal cartel pricep as a function of and similar^ (p; ) for the optimal …ne schedule^ (p). Proof. Note that, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function v ( ) given by (7) sup w(p C ( ; ); ; ) ; s.t. : : :
Continuity ofp( ) on [0; 1] guarantees continuity of the objective function in the last line.
Hence, an optimal 2 [0; 1] exists and the AA implements the minimal cartel pricep( ). Our previous results imply that, for = , the …ne schedule (p) given by either (13) or (21) 
implementsp( ).
Proposition 4 implies that optimal antitrust enforcement implements the minimal cartel pricep( ), however now this price is associated with the optimal level of detection, .
An increase in the detection probability reduces the minimal cartel price and this decreases the deadweight loss. Increasing the detection e¤ort will improve social welfare as long as the bene…ts in the form of a lower deadweight loss outweigh the costs of directing more of society's resources to detection. Moreover, changes in the detection probability should be accompanied by changes in the optimal …ne schedule, otherwise the cartel is able to set a cartel price above the minimal cartel price and extract a larger producer surplus at the expense of the demand side. Therefore, aligning both policy dimensions of antitrust enforcement is of utmost importance.
Equation (15) evaluated atp ( ) allows to investigate the trade-o¤ between the marginal costs and marginal bene…ts of changes in the detection probability, provided we additionally assume di¤erentiability of all functions. The …rst-order condition for an interior maximizer 2 (0; 1) of (15) is given bŷ
The left-hand side is positive, since the sum of the producer and consumer surpluses is de-
. 29 The total marginal bene…t depends upon the sensitivity of the minimal cartel price to changes in the detection probability and the standard sensitivity of the deadweight loss to price changes. In the social optimum, the marginal social bene…ts of detection equal the marginal social costs of this activity. A positive detection probability requires that the marginal social bene…ts at the no detection e¤ort level exceed the marginal costs of no e¤ort, i.e.,p
A detection probability smaller than 1 requires that the marginal social bene…ts at the maximum detection e¤ort level are lower than the marginal costs of this e¤ort
Finally, Proposition 4 also implies that we may characterize optimal antitrust enforcement in two separate steps: For arbitrary detection probability 2 [0; 1], characterize the minimal cartel pricep ( ) …rst, and then, solve for the optimal level of detection. The optimal detection probability 2 [0; 1] then immediately pins down the optimal …ne schedule as the optimal …ne schedule for = as derived in Section 4.3. Continuity of the minimal optimal cartel price in the detection probability ensures a social-welfare maximizing antitrust enforcement exists. As a …nal remark, the two-step procedure is mathematically convenient because it circumvents the technically challenging optimization over the space of …ne schedules.
Concluding Remarks
We provide a coherent framework to study the economic consequences of legal principles in crime enforcement with concerted illegal actions by several o¤enders. Our analysis characterizes optimal antitrust enforcement that consists of a pair of instruments: inspection e¤ort and a …ne schedule. The socially optimal antitrust enforcement trades o¤ the standard deadweight loss and the social cost of inspection while taking into account the optimal reaction by the cartel. In particular, the optimal …ne schedule coincides with the …ne schedule that minmaxes the cartel's pro…t at the optimal inspection e¤ort. This schedule remains below the legal ceiling, except at the cartel price where the minmax cartel pro…t is achieved under this legal ceiling, and there is a range of low cartel prices for which the …ne is set to zero according to the legal lower bound. Hence, the main implication of our analysis is that the antitrust authority should not punish maximally overall, but punish in a smarter manner such that mild o¤enses are not …ned at all. In general, our results call for a reconsideration of the common prescription in the economics of crime that setting the …ne equal to the available 29 The minimal cartel pricep ( ) is decreasing in , because the value function v given by (7) is decreasing in and, hence,p ( ) = 1 ((1 ) v ) is also decreasing in .
legal upper bound always increases the e¤ectiveness of deterrence. 30 By either adding or substituting other legal principles, one can easily assess the impact of such principles on optimal antitrust enforcement and the enforced cartel price. Therefore, our approach allows quantifying the economic costs of adapting society's legal principles through the di¤erences in society's deadweight losses. For example, increasing maximum penalties by shifting the legal ceiling upwards decreases the cartel's minmax value, and consequently, reduces the cartel price. Although the antitrust authority should shrink the range of low cartel prices where it …nes zero and raise the …ne schedule elsewhere, the optimal …ne schedule remains below the legal ceiling almost everywhere. As another example, imposing minimum …nes, a popular call in recent politics, will enable the cartel to set a higher price. Therefore, positive minimum …nes reduce social welfare and should never be imposed or, if they are currently implemented, they should be abolished. 31 Our analysis provides a technique to adequately deal with such modi…cations of legal rules. (2013), it is often argued that corporate antitrust …nes are insu¢ cient to successfully deter cartel formation given realistic levels of detection e¤orts and that the legal upper bounds should be increased. We agree that increasing the legal upper bound is a right trend in general. 32 But we also show that even in the presence of insu¢ cient legal upper bounds the e¤ectiveness of deterrence can still be improved by reducing …nes for mild o¤ences as our optimal …ne schedule prescribes.
The derived optimal …ne schedule can be related to the literature on marginal deterrence by Stigler (1971) , Shavell (1992) , Wilde (1992) and Mookherjee and Png (1994) . Our analysis generalizes the results in these references, in the absence of enforcement costs argument, to the case of a non-constant legal upper bound and both individual and group violations with multiple concerted illegal acts in the context of antitrust enforcement.
Finally, our analysis allows a two-step procedure: for arbitrary inspection e¤ort derive 30 Similar ideas are advocated in the literature on the optimality of maximal punishments that addresses the "Becker paradox" for individual illegal actions (see e.g. Shavell (1991) , Andreoni (1991) or Persson and Siven (2007) ). 31 In Houba et al. (2014) we perform a numerical calibration of the special case of the model described in the current paper in a repeated Bertrand model with linear demand and constant marginal cost and analyze comparative statics of the resulting minimal cartel price when either maximum or minimum …nes increase. There we also illustrate the structure of the optimal legally-constrained …ne schedule for the special case of the calibrated model. 32 In practice upper bounds on …nes are implemented in order to prevent bankruptcy or in order to reduce social costs of legal errors. This is the case in the EU and in many OECD countries as well (see e.g. EC (2006) or OECD (2002)). The focus of our paper is to derive the optimal …ne schedule that allows to minimize possible welfare distortions given that the current sentencing guidelines set restrictive (either explicit or implicit) upper bounds on …nes.
the minimal cartel price …rst, and then, solve for the socially optimal inspection e¤ort. The optimal …ne schedule follows from implementing the minimal cartel price at the socially optimal inspection e¤ort. This implies that the structure of the optimal …ne schedule derived for exogenous inspection e¤ort must be preserved under endogenous inspection e¤ort. These results indicate that it is worthwhile to align society's detection e¤ort with the structure of the sentencing guidelines, and vice versa, the design of the sentencing guidelines should take into account the restrictions on detection and prosecution e¤orts imposed by limited resources.
Appendix A: The Principle of Proportionality
In the EU the principle of proportionality has been developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union and requires that freedom of action should not be limited beyond the degree necessary in the public interest. 33 It appeared for the …rst time in a judgement of the Court in It is based on the concern to protect individuals against the State and on the assumption that regulatory intervention must be suitable to achieve its aims. 36 The measure in question must be appropriate and necessary to achieve its objectives. In the analysis of antitrust …nes this general principle of proportionality can be translated into "The …ne should not be in excess of the lowest …ne that su¢ ces to prevent criminal cartel activity."
This translation is implemented in the model of the current paper.
In the US the application of principle of proportionality is less transparent. (11) and (12) become 
The function exists, it is bounded from below by the constant function ( p) (1 )v and bounded from above by the monotone function (p) (1 )v (p). Obviously, equality in (19) holds in case the right-hand side is non-decreasing. Otherwise, there will be a strict inequality for some or all p 2 ( p; p M ].
If case (19) would hold with a strict inequality for all p 2 ( p; p M ], which holds whenever the right-hand side is decreasing in p, our analysis is done and the function characterizes the optimal …ne schedule^ for p 2 ( p; p M ]. The optimal …ne schedule is then given bŷ
This …ne schedule satis…es all legal principles and it implements the minimal cartel pricep as the least optimal cartel price.
Unfortunately, the strict inequality in (19) 
Then,^ can replace in (20) and this modi…ed …ne schedule achieves the minimal cartel pricê p as the least optimal cartel price. Although^ can approximate arbitrarily close, the strict inequality in (18) excludes that^ coincides with . So, we are able to satisfy three principles and by a hair the principle of proportionality on the interval ( p; p M ].
implementsp as the least optimal cartel price, it satis…es the legal principles of punishment …ts the crime, the legal lower bound and the legal upper bound. 
each individual …rm gets a pro…t that lies strictly between v and opt (p). Because of the …rst inequality, the upper bound fails the principle of proportionality to deter cartel price p.
Application of our insights to the boundary case v = 0, which would violate condition (4), yieldsp = p = p N and 1 ^ (p) as the optimal …ne schedule on p N ; p M . For this boundary case, all issues discussed in this appendix hold. To summarize, we regard the non-existence of the optimal …ne schedule that satis…es all four legal principles on p N ; p M as a technical matter of no practical importance. However, independent whether this issue arises, the following conclusions hold. First, the antitrust authority can secure the minimal cartel pricep by adopting the …ne schedule given by (21) . Second, such …ne schedules satisfy all four legal principles on the interval p N ; p .
Recall from Section 5 that full deterrence is obtained for > , and only partial deterrence otherwise. Full deterrence is also obtained for = if the supremum in (16) For a constant legal upper bound, i.e., b = 0, the supremum is attained at p M = 1 and for a linear legal upper bound with no intercept, i.e., a = 0, the supremum is attained at p N = 0.
We continue with the easiest case: the supremum is only attained at p N , or full deterrence at = . Then for any 2 ; 1 , the competitive price p N is the only sustainable cartel price and the associated value function of (7) equals the present value of the pro…t under competition, which is 0. If we express this present value as a function of , we have v ( ) = 0.
The optimal …ne schedule^ that implements the competitive price p N as the minimal cartel price and that satis…es the four legal principles is the function 1 ^ (p) for all p 2 p N ; p M , as discussed at the end of Appendix B.
For any 2 0; , condition (4) holds and the cartel has some cartel price above the competitive price that is sustainable and it has an incentive to form. Then, it holds for the associated value function of (7) expressed as a function of that v ( ) > 0 on 0; and (p) given by either (13) or (21) implementsp ( ). We note that v ( ) is decreasing in . Furthermore, recall that we de…ned p as the optimal cartel price under the legal upper bound, as illustrated in Figure 1 . For 2 0; , we de…ne the set of all such maximizers as P ( ). Then, full deterrence at = must imply that lim " P ( ) = p N , because otherwise
we would obtain the contradiction that a sustainable cartel price above the competitive price exists at = . Consequently, lim " v ( ) = 0, and hence, the function v ( ) is continuous in on the entire interval [0; 1]. Continuity of the function v ( ) is, similar to the proof of Proposition 4, the driving argument for existence of an optimal 2 [0; 1], which we do not further elaborate.
In case of full deterrence at = , we can make a somewhat stronger statement. Recall that for all 2 ; 1 , we have thatp( ) = p N and, therefore,
This is a decreasing function of . So, any > is suboptimal and we conclude that the optimal must lie in 0; . Similar as in Section 5, the structure of the optimal …ne schedule in Section 4 has to be preserved in the setting where both the probability of detection and the …ne schedule are endogenous. The above arguments and following the arguments of the proof of Proposition 4 imply the following result. (ii) (p) =^ (p; ), where^ (p; ) is given by either (13), or (21) .
In principle, this result is similar to Proposition 4, except that 0; replaces [0; 1] and that full deterrence is attained at . Partial deterrence is optimal if < and, otherwise, full deterrence is optimal. In case of di¤erentiability of all functions, (17) holds on 0; and a detection probability smaller than requires that the marginal social bene…ts at the lowest full deterrence e¤ort level are lower than the marginal costs of that e¤ort level, i.e., 
is well de…ned and that, technically speaking, it cannot be attained. In practice, the supremum can be attained arbitrarily close. 
Obviously, the second term under the maximum is given by (24) . Furthermore, the …rst term under the maximum can be solved similar as in Proposition 7: Hence, society prefers either to partially deter cartel formation by choosing its detection e¤orts to achieve 2 0; , or to fully deter cartel formation by choosing its detection e¤orts slightly above . In the latter case, the non-existence of an optimal level of detection e¤orts should not be regarded as a real issue in practice. We omit summarizing all these results in a proposition.
To summarize Section 5 and this appendix, optimal antitrust enforcement ( ; ) maximizes per-period social welfare n (p( )) + CS (p( )) c ( ), implements the minimal cartel pricep( ) and the optimal …ne schedule derived in Section 4 has to be an integral part of optimal antitrust enforcement.
